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The lack of coordination in the resolution of multinational banks has led to de-
mands for the increased centralization of resolution regimes. However, as this
paper argues, the anticipation of resolution procedures affects the incentives of
host countries to impose capital standards on their resident banks. Critically, it
is shown that overall welfare can even be decreased by introducing a centralized
resolution regime without fully centralizing capital requirements. As, in the af-
termath of the financial crisis, only countries that are not part of a supranational
resolution regime unilaterally and significantly increased the capital requirements
for their largest resident banks, this paper can help to understand and study the
heterogeneity of the observed regulatory approaches.
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1 Introduction
During the recent financial crisis, government responses towards ailing banks were
largely driven by the attempt to limit the damage for national taxpayers. However,
as the liquidation procedure of Lehman Brothers Holding Inc. (LBHI), the parent
company of Lehman Brothers, illustrated, this approach caused serious international
contagion effects. While the US authorities refused to support LBHI, they did support
the US broker-dealer subsidiary that could be later merged successfully with Barclays
Capital. In contrast, the resolution of the remaining subsidiaries that were present in 49
countries was more costly. This was especially due to the high degree of centralization
and complexity of the LBHI, that would have made it necessary for the national author-
ities to cooperate (Claessens et al., 2010). Similar patterns could be observed during
the crises of the Icelandic banking system, where banks had established a Europe-wide
system of savings accounts that broke down at the onset of the financial crisis (see
Benediktsdottir et al., 2011). Further, the large amount of governmental support to-
wards Fortis, a multinational bank with large presence in Belgium, the Netherlands and
Luxembourg, was mainly attributed to the lack of cooperation between the national
supervisory authorities.1
As a consequence, improvements in the process and the decision about the resolution
of multinational banks are high on the political agenda. Proposals include demands
for multinational banks to map their line of business into the corporate entities and
clarify key interconnections across affiliates (centralized information). Further measures
foresee a better collaboration and more rights to intervene for international supervisory
colleges (centralized resolution).2 These measures are expected to lead to a reduction
in expected bankruptcy costs of multinational banks.
Interestingly, however, it is by no means clear that coordinated resolution regimes
will also decrease the total expected cost for national taxpayers. On the one hand,
once multinational banks are in difficulty, coordinated resolution regimes can reduce
the failure costs. On the other hand, as this paper will show, the anticipation of a
coordinated resolution approach can increase the need for public intervention. This is
1See Claessens et al. (2010) for a study on Fortis and for further cases of cross-border resolution
procedures during the recent financial crises.
2See Hagan and Vinals (2010), Claessens et al. (2010) and Allen et al. (2011) for discussions on
various structures of resolution regimes for multinational banks.
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due to its negative effect on the incentives of national authorities to impose adequate
capital standards and thus on the capacity of multinational banks to absorb losses.
This paper introduces a model where countries compete for the investment of multi-
national bank subsidiaries. While each country benefits from the investment in normal
times, costs arise in case that the subsidiary is hit by a shock and has to default. There
exist two regulatory instruments to curb these costs. First, each regulation authority
can impose capital standards for the subsidiary that is resident in its country. How-
ever, as this reduces the subsidy from deposit insurance, a unilateral increase will lead
to the reallocation of investment to the subsidiary that is located in the other coun-
try. Second, each regulation authority can intervene into the operation of its resident
subsidiary whenever the probability of default is sufficiently large. Here, national reg-
ulation authorities fail to account for the international spillovers that are caused by
the reallocation of capital within the multinational bank network in case of unilateral
shocks.
First, we show that moving from a national to a global intervention regime changes the
non-cooperative equilibrium of capital standards that are chosen by national regulation
authorities. Accounting for the externality at the intervention stage, moving towards
a global intervention regime raises the value of one unit of bank investment and thus
increases the welfare loss when capital standards are unilaterally increased. Further,
when national intervention would be too lax from a global welfare perspective, the
increase in safety caused by a more global regime makes it less attractive for each regu-
lation to impose strict capital standards. This result of the paper might help to explain
why countries like Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States, which all
host large multinational banks but are not integrated in a multinational intervention
regime, have substantially tightened bank capital requirements, while countries within
the Euro Zone have so far not departed from the minimum standard in the Basel 3
framework.
We then analyse the welfare effect of different intervention regimes. Thereby we study
the interaction between the anticipation of supervisory decisions, the determination
of capital standards and the externalities that are induced without full coordination
in both regulatory instruments. We can then define a condition that whenever bank
investment is sufficiently profitable and mobile and thus the externality that arises
due to non-cooperative capital standards is large, moving towards a more centralized
intervention regime is welfare decreasing.
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This paper wants to add to the current policy debate about the strategies in the in-
tervention and resolution of multinational banks. Our analysis is especially important
for Europe, where multilateral resolution procedures are aimed at in the new banking
union. Most authors support the idea of a more centralized approach (Claessens et
al., 2010; Beck and Wagner, 2016). However, until now, the determination of precise
intervention criteria and the (partial) transfer of budgetary sovereignty in case of de-
fault have impeded the full implementation.3 This is similar to the harmonization in
bank capital standards, where European countries still differ in the application of rules
that have to be put in place at the Member state level (Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision, 2014). Importantly, as this paper argues, both initiatives should only be
negotiated and agreed upon in a closely coordinated approach. Otherwise, unilateral
approaches towards more centralization in the resolution of multinational banks might
even prove to be economically harmful.
The analysis in this paper builds on several strands of the literature. Various authors ex-
amined the effects of capital regulation on financial institutions (Rochet, 1992; Hellman
et al., 2000; Repullo, 2004). This literature stresses that capital regulation increases the
risk buffer of banks and curbs risky behaviour. However, introducing bank mobility, the
existing literature shows that in the non-cooperative equilibrium capital requirements
are set inefficiently low from a global welfare perspective (Sinn 1997, 2003; Dell’Ariccia
and Marquez, 2006).4
Several papers discuss the inefficiencies that derive from a decentralized supervision
regime.5 Beck et al. (2013) and Beck and Wagner (2016) analyze the distortions in the
intervention decision of host country regulators that are caused by foreign ownership
3See ”Banking on a new union - The promises and pitfalls of the euro zone’s next big idea”, The
Economist, December 14, 2013.
4The decision for banks to operate multinational is analyzed in the theoretical paper by Niepmann
(2015). Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2010) analyze the decision of multinational banks between branch-
based and subsidiary-based corporate structures.
5Different aspects regarding the role of supervision within the regulatory framework have been
discussed in the literature. Aghion et al. (1999) and Mitchell (2000) analyse incentive schemes to
overcome the information problem between the management of the bank and the supervisory authority.
The distribution of supervisory tasks between different institutions, e.g. central bank and deposit
insurance fund, is analyzed in the work of Repullo (2000) and Kahn and Santos (2005). The adequacy
of different measures of intervention, e.g. liquidation or restructuring, is analyzed in Dewatripont
and Freixas (2011). Calzolari and Loranth (2011) focus on the effect of the multinational bank’s
organizational structure on the distortions that arise from national supervision authorities.
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of bank assets, bank equity and bank deposits. Goodhart and Schoenmaker (2009)
analyze ex-ante burden sharing agreements between hosting nations of multinational
banks that can be implemented to overcome the inefficient ex-post negotiations on the
recapitalization of failing banks.
However, to the best of knowledge, so far no paper has analyzed the combined role of
capital standards and supervisory regimes in a multinational bank framework. Closest
to this paper, Acharya (2003) studies the interaction of capital standards and bailout
policies. In the framework of Acharya (2003), however, international spillovers arise
due to national banks that compete on regional bank markets. In this paper, in con-
trast, externalities arise due to the reallocation of capital between different subsidiaries
within a multinational bank network. The importance of this internal capital market
at multinational banks, which allocates capital between its affiliates, has been stressed
in the recent empirical literature (see e.g. Cetorelli and Goldberg 2012). The findings
of this literature on the role of multinational banks during times of financial distress
can be summarized as follows. On the one hand, the internal capital market of multi-
national banks can play a supportive role for subsidiaries that face idiosyncratic shocks
(see e.g. Navaretti et al., 2010). At the same time, the reallocation of funds between
affiliates of a multinational bank network might also lead to the propagation of local
shocks (see e.g Peek and Rosengren, 1997; De Haas and Van Horen, 2012). In our
model, we account for both of these possible outcomes.
The remainder of this paper is set up as follows. Section 2 describes the setup of the
model. The basic model is solved by backward induction in section 3, while the welfare
analysis is carried out in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
2.1 Bank investment
We consider one representative multinational bank that owns two subsidiaries and has
a unique technology of monitoring entrepreneurs. One subsidiary is located in country
A while the other subsidiary is resident in country B. Each subsidiary has access to an
unlimited amount of domestically raised (insured) deposits at cost of one. In contrast,
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the supply of bank equity is assumed to be fixed at the level of the multinational bank.6
The amount of equity at the subsidiary in country A is denoted α. The allocation
decision will be analyzed below. Further, we assume that firms do not have any funds
of their own so that one unit of loan distributed in country i translates into one unit
of investment Ii.
The investment of banks is prone to country specific shocks. Consequently, the return to
each unit of bank investment is perfectly correlated within each country and perfectly
uncorrelated between both countries. If the shock does not hit country i, each unit of
investment leads to the production of one unit of a homogenous consumer good in this
country. We assume that both countries are symmetric with respect to the size of the
market A and that each national output market is characterized by the inverse demand
function pi = A − ayi. Allowing for free entry of firms that can produce at zero cost,
the return of each unit of bank investment in country i in case of successful production
is therefore equal to the price on the national output market and given by
Ri = A− aIi . (1)
Obviously, as all profits accrue to the bank subsidiary, Ri is a positive function of the
exogenous parameter A and a negative function of total investment in country i. When
the investment is successful, the bank subsidiary will be able to repay its depositors and
pay out the surplus to the equity holders. Including the surplus to consumers and given
that the subsidiary in country i is not hit by a shock, each unit of bank investment
generates




If, in contrast, country i is hit by a shock, the return of the investment will be zero.
Abstracting, for now, from the internal capital market of the multinational bank that
reallocates capital between its subsidiaries, the bank subsidiary that is located in coun-
try i will not be able to repay its depositors. In this case, the repayment obligations
will be shifted to the deposit insurance system. The existence of a deposit insurance
system, which equals common practice in virtually all developed countries, can be ex-
plained by the prevention of expectation-driven bank runs. These runs would occur due
6This simplification is often made in the literature, e.g. Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2006). It rep-
resents the notion that bank capital is difficult to raise on short notice. All results would remain
qualitatively unaffected if we would instead assume that the bank can raise additional equity but
faces higher expected cost than for deposits.
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to the possibility for depositors to withdraw their funds at any time. The welfare costs
of these bank-runs have been well documented (see e.g. Bryant 1980 and Diamond and
Dybvig 1983). Critically, as shown in the analysis of Acharya and Dreyfuss (1988) and
Chan et al. (1992) among others, due to asymmetric information and timing problems,
it might not be possible to charge banks with fair insurance rates. Experienced diffi-
culties to (fully) recoup the vast amount of financial support from taxpayers during
and after the financial crisis confirm this feature of deposit insurance as a subsidy to
bank owners. We model this by assuming that the default of the bank subsidiary that
is located in country i causes social costs for each unit of investment equal to
cd = c(1− ki) . (3)
The exogenous parameter c captures the cost of raising one unit of funds to reimburse
depositors. These costs are primarily due to distortions caused by the collection of
public funds. Further, as we only allow for two different types of funds, deposits and
equity, the amount of insured deposits for each unit of investment is equal to the total
investment net of the amount of equity ki that the subsidiary in country i is required
to hold by the national regulation authority.
2.2 Bank regulation
In this model, the role for regulation follows from two facts. First, as shown in Eq. (3),
the default of the bank subsidiary in country i has social costs. Second, due to the
limited liability of bank owners and the presence of the deposit insurance system, bank
owners have no incentive to curb these costs.
We allow for two regulatory instruments. First, the national regulation authority in
country i can impose capital requirements ki. This standard determines the amount of
equity that the subsidiary in country i has to invest for each unit of loan. Equation (3)
illustrates the buffer function of capital standards. As an increase in ki decreases the
amount of fixed claims (deposits) for each unit of investment, the expected cost of
default decreases in turn. At the same time, however, due to the fixed amount of
equity, which we normalize to one, capital standards also limit the total investment of





where eA = α is the amount of equity that the multinational bank allocates to the
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subsidiary in country A, while eB = 1− α is the amount of equity at the subsidiary in
country B. Below, we will analyze the allocation of equity between both subsidiaries.
Second, we assume that a supervisory authority can intervene into the activity of
each bank subsidiary. The modelling approach for this part follows Beck and Wagner
(2016). After the investment of each subsidiary, but before the realisation of the shock,
the supervisory authority will receive a signal indicating the probability λi that the
investment of the subsidiary in country i will be successful. To simplify, we assume λi
to be uniformly distributed between [0, 1].7 Then, for a given intervention threshold
λ̃i, which we will derive below, we can differentiate between three scenarios. First,
for λi < λ̃i and thus with probability λ̃i, the supervisory authority will intervene.
We assume that in this scenario the regulation authority is able to recover the initial
investment Ii.
8 Second, given that the supervisory authority will not intervene, the
probability that country i will not be hit by a shock is equal to 1+λ̃i
2
. Consequently,







the subsidiary is allowed to continue but then hit by a shock. The ex-ante probability




In this model, we are mainly interested in the interaction of capital standards and
intervention thresholds in the case that countries do not fully coordinate in the deter-
mination of both regulatory instruments. Even in the presence of the Basel 3 Accord, a
global regulatory framework, this setting should be a realistic reflection of the current
situation. First, the Basel 3 Accord constitutes only a voluntary framework that further
leaves scope for national evaluations, e.g. with respect to the discretionary surcharge of
a ’counter-cyclical buffer‘ of up to 2.5%. Second, it seems to be widely believed that the
capital standards that are specified in the Basel 3 framework are insufficient for large
multinational banks.9 The United States have already introduced a minimum leverage
7While this distribution corresponds to the ex-ante shock probability being equal to 1/2, our results
would not be affected qualitatively by different values.
8The intervention can take different forms, e.g. assumption of operation involving another bank,
and might also incur specific costs. However, as long as these costs are sufficiently small relative to
the costs arising after the shock, the same qualitative results would be obtained.
9See www.financialstabilityboard.org/wp-content/uploads/TLAC-Condoc-6-Nov-2014-FINAL.pdf
for a consultative document of the Financial Stability Board in response to the G20 St. Petersburg
Summit in 2013 that discusses Pillar 1 total loss absorbing capital requirements for systemically
important banks and proposes capital standards in the range of 16− 20%.
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ratio of 5−6% for eight systemically important financial institutions.10 This level is well
above the leverage ratio of 3% that is foreseen under the Basel 3 framework. Similarly,
the United Kingdom and Switzerland have also tightened the capital standards for their
largest banks above the minimum standards of Basel 3.11 Therefore, we assume that
the capital standards in the first stage of our model are determined non-cooperatively.
Starting from this assumption, we are then interested in the evaluation of supervisory
regimes that differ with respect to the degree of centralisation.
2.3 Internal capital market of the multinational bank
Each affiliate of the multinational bank is organized as a subsidiary. Therefore, it is
a locally incorporated stand-alone entity endowed with own capital and protected by
limited liability at the affiliate level. Consequently, in the case of financial difficulties at
the level of one subsidiary, there would be no legal obligation for the multinational bank
to relocate capital between subsidiaries to solve this problem. However, and crucially,
there might be other reasons.
The primary reason for the multinational bank to prevent the insolvency of its sub-
sidiaries is reputational. The particular importance of this argument is connected to
the characteristic of banking. Due to the illiquidity of its asset side (e.g. loans), the
large amount of short-term liabilities and the opaqueness of the financial market, it is of
critical importance for each bank to be viewed as trustworthy by all stakeholders (bor-
rowers, investors and regulation authorities). Therefore, the failure of one subsidiary
might cause an interruption to the provision of liquidity for all subsidiaries within the
bank network and thus amplify the cost for the multinational bank. Further, regulation
authorities might also demand the replacement of the multinational bank management
following the default of subsidiaries that are part of the multinational bank network.
As already discussed, the empirical literature shows that due to the reallocation of cap-
ital within the multinational bank network, subsidiaries, in contrast to purely domestic
banks, can either be more stable or more prone to external shocks. We try to account
for both of these possible outcomes by modelling multinational bank behaviour in the





reallocation between both subsidiaries will take place. In contrast, whenever only one
subsidiary is hit by a shock, the multinational bank can react and reallocate capital to
the affected subsidiary. However, as we assume that the shock will take place before
the end of the period and thus before the investment in both countries pays off, the
subsidiary in the non-affected country has to incur liquidation losses to meet the im-
mediate capital demand. In expected terms, we assume these cost to be smaller than
the reputational costs that would arise from a partial default of the subsidiary that
was hit by the shock. Consequently, given a unilateral shock, the multinational bank
will always decide to liquidate the subsidiary’s investment in the non-affected country.
To allow for a rich set of possible outcomes, we assume that l, the liquidation loss per
unit of investment, is distributed according to the function h(l) that generates positive




















lr = Ri − (1− ki)− (1− kj) , (6)
lc = Ri − (1− ki) . (7)
To illustrate the effect of capital reallocation within the multinational bank, we analyze
the different outcomes of the scenario in which the subsidiary in country j is hit by a
shock and, thus, the subsidiary in country i liquidates its assets to reallocate capital
to the affected subsidiary. First, if the liquidation loss of the subsidiary in country i is
sufficiently small (l ≤ lr), the multinational bank will be able to reallocate capital to
the subsidiary in country j to allow for the repayment of depositors in both countries.
Therefore, in this case, the subsidiary in country j that is hit by a shock will be
rescued through the internal capital market by funds of the subsidiary in country i.
The expected liquidation loss given that l ≤ lr is labeled µr(l). Second, for liquidation
losses within the range of lr < l < lc, the subsidiary in country i will be able to repay
its local depositors but the remaining funds will be too small to further repay the
depositors in country j. Consequently, the subsidiary that is located in country j will
default, while the subsidiary in country i will remain open. The expected liquidation
loss given that lr < l < lc is labeled µm(l). Third, if the liquidation loss is sufficiently
severe (l > lc), even the subsidiary in country i will not be able to repay its depositors.
Thus, in this scenario the shock in country j is contagious in the sense that it triggers
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the default of the subsidiary in country i that was not hit by a shock. The expected
liquidation loss given that l > lc is labeled µc(l).
Equations (5)-(7) illustrate the positive welfare effect of an increase in capital standards
on the outcome of the internal capital reallocation by the multinational bank. Due to
the fact that capital standards define the buffer that can take losses, following an
increase in k, each affiliate can withstand greater liquidation losses, which leads to an
increase of pr and a decrease of pc.
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Besides the liquidation costs that are private to the bank owners, additional social cost
arise.13 These costs arise when entrepreneurs depend on the continuous funding of the
bank subsidiary and are thus not able to finish their projects, leading to a reduction in
consumer surplus. Further costs might be due to the loss of private information between
the entrepreneur and the bank following the termination of the relationship. These
expected additional liquidation costs are labeled µe(l). Therefore, the total expected
social liquidation cost for each unit of investment are given by




+ µe(l) . (8)
While the expected cost in the first two terms of (8) are private to the bank owners,
the expected cost in the third term are only private to the degree that the bank owners
stock of equity is depleted. The remaining losses measured in the third term, as well as
the losses captured in the fourth term of (8) are not internalized by the bank owner.
However due to the prevention of the subsidiaries’ default whenever l ≤ lr, the overall
welfare effect of the internal capital reallocation of the multinational bank remains
ambiguous.
2.4 Time structure
The sequence of events in this model is illustrated in figure 1. In the first period, reg-
ulation authorities in both countries non-cooperatively set capital standards for the
subsidiary that is resident in the respective country. In the second period the multi-
national bank allocates its equity between the subsidiaries in country A and country
12See Anginer et al., 2016 for a empirical study that analyses the default risk of foreign bank
subsidiaries. The authors find a positive effect of equity holding at the subsidiary level on the contagion
risk within the multinational bank network.
13See Dell’Ariccia et al (2008) and Chor and Manova (2012) for empirical studies that support this
assessment.
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Figure 1: The timeline of events
B. In the third period the supervision authority will receive a signal about the success
probability of the investment in both countries. It will intervene into the operation of
the subsidiary in country i whenever the success probability λ is below the threshold λ̃.
At this stage we will analyze the differences between the outcome of a national and a
global regime. Between the third and the fourth period each subsidiary, when allowed
to continue, can be affected by a shock in its resident country. In case that one of
the two subsidiaries is hit by a shock, the subsidiary that is not hit by the shock will
liquidate its assets, thereby incurring liquidation losses of l that follow the distribution
h(l). Finally, in the fourth period, the payoffs will realize. We will solve the model by
backward induction.
3 Nationally optimal capital standards with differ-
ent intervention regimes
3.1 t=4: Payoffs
For each country, the expected payoff from the activity of the resident subsidiary of
the multinational bank depends on the regulatory framework (k and λ̃) and on the
allocation of capital by the multinational bank (α). The resulting welfare function of





























The first term in (9) measures the expected return from the intervention of the supervi-
sion authority into the investment of the subsidiary in country A. It is equal to λ̃A due
to the fact that the regulation authority will intervene whenever λ < λ̃A and recover
the initial investment of one in this case. The second term in (9) captures the expected
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payoff in case that the subsidiary is allowed to continue and not hit by a shock. Then,
whenever the investment is not liquidated early, each unit of investment will yield the
social return of vA[see eq. (2)]. In contrast, when the subsidiary in country B is hit by a
shock, the welfare in country A will be reduced by the expected liquidation cost clA [see
eq. (8)]. The expected cost in case that the supervision authority does not intervene
and the subsidiary is hit by a shock is given in the third term of (9). Here, the return
of the bank investment will be zero and the additional default costs cdA, which are given
in (3), will arise, unless the subsidiary will be rescued. This will happen whenever the
subsidiary in country B is not hit by a shock and the liquidation losses are sufficiently
small. Finally, the last term in (9) is equal to the opportunity cost of each unit of
investment.
3.2 t=3: Supervisory intervention: national vs. global regime
At this stage, the supervisory authority receives a signal about the probability λi that
the bank investment in country i will be successful. Due to the reallocation of capital
by the multinational bank in case that one subsidiary is hit by a shock, the intervention
decision in country i affects the expected welfare in country j [see eq. (9)]. We want
to compare two regimes that differ in the degree that this externality is taken into
account. We start with the decision of a national supervisory regime. Therefore, we


























Equation (10) shows that a marginal increase in the intervention threshold λ̃A increases
the expected return from intervention (first term) and decreases the expected cost from
failure (third term). However, clearly, it also reduces the expected return from successful
investment (second term). Therefore, the intervention threshold is chosen relatively low
whenever the expected return from successful investment is relatively large, while for
large expected costs from failure, the intervention threshold is relatively high.
The ambiguous sign of the interaction term between the intervention threshold in each
country is due to the ambiguous welfare effect that follows from the reallocation of cap-
ital by the multinational bank. As explained in the previous section, the continuation
of the subsidiary in country B will be welfare increasing for country A from an ex-post
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perspective, whenever the shock unilaterally hits the resident subsidiary. However, it
can also be welfare decreasing, whenever only country B is hit by a shock. Whenever
the expected cost from liquidation is large, the positive effect of a marginal increase in
λ̃B on the expected return from continuation outweighs the negative effect on the ex-
pected cost from continuation that is due to the lower probability of rescue. Therefore
in this case it holds that ∂λ̃A
∂λ̃B
< 0, while for low expected cost from liquidation and
thus high probability of rescue we get ∂λ̃A
∂λ̃B
> 0.
Taking into account the effect of kA, Equation (10) shows that a marginal increase
in kA decreases the optimal intervention threshold for three reasons. First, marginally
increasing kA reduces the expected cost from liquidation due to the lower probability
of contagion [see eqs. (5) and (7)]. This in turn increases the expected return from
successful investment and thus decreases the optimal intervention threshold. Second,
an increase in kA reduces the expected cost from default by limiting the amount of
public funds [see eq. (3)], while third it increases the probability of rescue [see eqs. (5)
and (6)]. Both effects decrease the expected cost of continuation and thus also lead to
a decrease in the optimal intervention threshold.















B = 0 . (11)
Equation (11) shows two externalities that are taken into account by the global su-
pervisory regime. The first externality, which is captured in the second term of (11) is
positive. The marginal increase in the intervention threshold for the subsidiary located
in country A benefits country B due to the fact that it reduces the probability of failure
for the subsidiary in country A and thus decreases the expected cost from liquidation
for the subsidiary in country B. In contrast, the second externality that is equal to
the third term of (11) is negative. This is caused by the negative effect of a marginal
increase in λ̃A on the ex-ante success probability of the investment by the subsidiary
in country A, which in turn reduces the probability that the subsidiary in country B
will be rescued through the internal capital market of the multinational bank.
We can now use (11) to compare the intervention threshold of the national and the




< 0 follows directly from (10), it is clear that the
intervention threshold chosen by the global supervisory regime can be either more strict
or more lenient than the intervention threshold by the national supervisory regime. It
will be more strict whenever the positive welfare effect of an increase in λ̃i on the
13
expected cost from liquidation in country j outweighs the negative welfare effect that
is due to the decrease in the rescue probability. However, and clearly, if we stopped
at this stage, the global supervisory regime would be welfare superior to the national
regime independent of the direction of the deviation between both regimes.
3.3 t=2: Investment decision by the multinational bank
We now want to analyse the allocation of equity between the subsidiaries in country










































r[µr(l) + (1− kB)] + p
mµm(l) + pc(RA − 1 + kA) (13)
cpB = p
r[µr(l) + (1− kA)] + p
mµm(l) + pc(RB − 1 + kB) . (14)
The first row in (12) captures the expected profit of the subsidiary located in country
A, while the expected profit of the subsidiary located in country B is displayed in
the second row. Abstracting from the success of the subsidiary in the other country,
in case of no supervisory intervention and no shock, the net return of the subsidiary’s
investment in each country will be equal to Ri−1. However, in case that the subsidiary
in the other country is hit by a shock additional liquidation costs occur. Equations (13)
and (14) show that these costs depend on the severity of the liquidation shock. In case
that the liquidation shock is sufficiently weak, the subsidiary will not only incur these
losses (µr(l)) but also repay the depositors in the other country. For medium liquidation
shocks, the subsidiary will still be able to repay its own depositors but lose µs(l) in
expectation. However for severe liquidation shocks, the subsidiary will lose the entire
return of the project but will benefit from limited liability as the depositors (1−ki) are
reimbursed through the deposit insurance system. Finally, if the subsidiary is allowed
to continue but hit by a shock, the bank owner will lose the amount of equity that
is invested in the project. In this case, the depositors will either be repayed by the
subsidiary in the other country (with probability pr) or by the deposit insurance.
14
14Due to our assumption of the supervisory regime liquidating with zero costs, the profit of the
bank remains unaffected with probability λ̃.
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We now want to analyse the allocation of equity at the level of the multinational bank
that can choose between the subsidiaries in country A and country B. In Appendix
A.1 we show that the amount of equity that the multinational bank allocates to the
















2 − (1− λ̃A)
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Equation (15) shows that the multinational bank will equally allocate its equity between
its subsidiaries whenever both countries are symmetric. In this case, the second term
of (15) becomes zero. Further, deriving the partial derivatives of α with respect to the






































Equations (18) and (19) make clear that a unilateral increase in one of the regulatory
instruments will lead to an outflow of bank capital from this country. Intuitively, when
ki is increased, the subsidiary that is located in country i can use a lower amount of
subsidized deposits for each unit of investment. This in turn decreases the attractive-
ness for the multinational bank to allocate (scarce) equity to the subsidiary that is
located in country i. Similarly, an increase in the expected threshold of intervention
λ̃i decreases the expected value of the investment in this country from the perspective
of the multinational bank. Obviously, the results hinge on the (realistic) assumption
that both regulatory instruments are binding. This will be the case whenever the cost
from failure and liquidation that are not internalized by the bank are sufficiently high
relative to the benefit of continuation from the perspective of the consumer.16
15This is shown in Appendix A.2.
16See Appendix A.2 for the precise condition.
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3.4 t=1: Capital standards
We can now turn to the analysis of the capital standards that are set non-cooperatively
in the first stage of our model. Given the symmetric setup, maximizing (9) with respect











































































































(1− 2λ̃)(pc − pr)− (1− λ̃)
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0 if global supervisory regime
1 if national supervisory regime
(24)
Looking at (20), we can decompose the welfare effect of a marginal increase in kA into
three parts. The first term in (20) measures the welfare effect that is due to the change
in the subsidiary’s investment in country A, while the second term in (20) includes the
welfare effect of kA on the expected cost of liquidation and failure. Finally, the third
term in (20) captures the indirect effect of kA on the intervention threshold in both
countries. We will now analyze each effect in turn to emphasize the effect of different
supervisory regimes on the level of capital standards at this stage.
According to the first term in (20), bank investment in country A decreases for two
reasons when capital standards in country A are unilaterally increased. First, obviously,
16
as the capital standard is binding and the amount of equity is fixed, the only way for the
bank to meet the requirement of funding each unit of investment with a larger amount
of equity is to reduce the total amount of investment. Second, however, due to the
mobility of bank investment [see eq. (18)] the multinational bank will allocate more
equity to the subsidiary in country B whenever country A unilaterally increases its
capital standard. The welfare loss that follows from this reduction in bank investment
is shown in (21). Now, critically, due to the different intervention thresholds that are
set by the national and the global supervisory regime [see eqs. (10) and (11)], the
marginal social return to bank investment in country A will be higher under the global
supervisory regime. Therefore, the negative welfare effect of a marginal increase in kA
that follows from the reduction in bank investment will be larger under the global
supervisory regime.
The positive welfare effect of a marginal increase in kA on the expected cost from bank
investment is captured in (22). The first term in (22) measures the decrease in the
social cost from bank failure. This will be relevant either when country A is hit by a
shock [first term in square bracket of (22)] or when the liquidation loss of the subsidiary
located in country A is sufficiently high [second term in square bracket of (22)]. As the
probability of bank failure is decreasing in λ̃, it is clear that the positive welfare effect
of kA on the social cost of bank failure is reduced when the intervention threshold is
higher. Further, as shown in the second line of (22), the marginal increase of kA changes
the probability of the different outcomes that can arise from the reallocation of capital.
Both terms are positive as one can directly see from (5)-(7). Intuitively, by increasing
the buffer that can take losses without causing insolvency, higher capital standards
in country A increase the range of liquidation losses for the subsidiary in country B
where it can still rescue the subsidiary in country A. Likewise the range of liquidation
losses for which the subsidiary in country A can default itself is reduced. Again, these
positive effects are decreasing in the intervention threshold. Consequently, (22) will be
larger under the national supervisory regime whenever the global supervisory regime
is more strict (λ̃g > λ̃n).
The third term in (20) captures the indirect welfare effects that are due to the change
in the intervention threshold in both countries when kA is increased. Under the national
supervisory regime, we can ignore ∂WFA
∂λ̃A
as one can directly see from the optimization




. Here, kA only affects the intervention
decision by the national supervisory regime in B to the degree that it changes the
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probability of rescue for the subsidiary in B. As an increase in kA enhances the prob-
ability of rescue for the subsidiary in B [see eqs. (5) and (6)], this will decrease the
intervention threshold in B. The induced welfare effect for A depends on the relative
importance of the rescue to the contagion effect [see eq. (23)]. Consequently, whenever
the indirect welfare effect of kA through λ is relatively strong, then this effect will be
positive as A will be positively affected by the decrease in the intervention threshold
in B due to the higher probability of rescue. This in turn reinforces the effects in (22)
under the national supervisory regime. Turning to the global supervisory regime, we














. Under the global supervisory regime there exist two
indirect effects of kA through λ̃. First, the decrease in the contagion risk in A leads
to a decrease of the intervention threshold in both countries. Here, given that the
lower intervention threshold partially reverses the decrease in the contagion risk, this
indirect effect has negative welfare implications for country A whenever this effect is
relatively strong.17 Compared to the national supervisory regime, this again reduces
the positive welfare effects of a marginal increase in kA under the global supervisory
regime. Second, the increase in kA reduces the cost of default, which in turn reduces
the intervention threshold in country A and country B under the global supervisory
regime. While the effects of lower intervention thresholds in A and B partly balance
each other, the overall welfare effect again depends on the relative importance of the
rescue and contagion externality. We can now summarize our findings at this stage in:
Proposition 1 When the intervention of national supervisory authorities into the local
operation of multinational bank subsidiaries is less strict than globally optimal, then
changing to a regime of global supervision will reduce the capital standards that are set
non-cooperatively. The reduction in capital standards is less pronounced and can even
be reversed when the intervention threshold of the national supervisory authorities is
inefficiently high.
Proposition 1 tells us that the incentives of national regulation authorities to impose
capital standards on the resident subsidiaries of multinational banks are affected by the
expectation about the procedure and the externalities that arise from the intervention
17This effect is not present in the case of a national supervisory regime as the contagion risk of the
other country is not included in the maximization problem.
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regime. As the analysis of (20) has shown, this is mainly for two reasons. First, increas-
ing the efficiency of intervention by changing to a global supervisory regime raises the
value of one unit of bank investment from the perspective of the national regulation
authority. This in turn increases the competition between the regulation authorities
in both countries to attract mobile bank investment and thus decreases the amount
of capital standards that are set non-cooperatively. Second, each regulation authority
imposes capital standards to increase the safety of its banking system. Obviously, the
incentive to impose strict capital standards depends on the probability of bank failure,
which in our model is a negative function of the intervention threshold λ̃. Therefore,
when national intervention regimes are too lax from a global welfare perspective, mov-
ing to a global supervisory will result in higher λ̃. This reinforces the incentive for
national regulation authorities to decrease its capital standards. In contrast, whenever
the positive externalities of bank continuation dominate, introducing a global supervi-
sory regime will lower λ̃ and therefore, ceteris paribus, increase k. Thus, in this case
we can not unambiguously sign the effect of a more centralized intervention regime on
the level of capital standards that are set non-cooperatively.
4 The welfare effect of moving towards a global su-
pervisory regime
We now want to use the results from the analysis in section 3 to discuss the welfare
implications of a more centralized supervisory regime. Therefore, we assume that the
supervisory regime takes account of the net externality that arises at the stage of
intervention [see eq. (11)] with a factor 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1. We start at γ = 0 and analyse
the welfare effect of a marginal increase in γ. In Appendix A.3 we show that, given
the symmetry of countries and thus δλ̃A/δγ = δλ̃B/δγ = δλ̃/δγ, the welfare effect of a






















































































































Equation (25) shows that moving towards a global supervisory regime affects the wel-
fare of each country through two channels. The first effect, which is always positive, is
due to the fact that the externality at the intervention stage is taken into account. This
is the effect on which the theoretical literature(see Beck and Wagner 2016) as well as
policy reports (see Claessens et al. 2010) have focused. The second effect is due to the
interaction of the regulatory instruments. As we have already analyzed in the previous
section, this relation critically depends on the sign of the externality. Therefore, we
discuss both scenarios one after the other.
4.1 Case 1: national supervision that is too lax
We start with the scenario that λ̃g > λ̃n. Obviously, in this case a marginal increase in
the centralization of the supervisory regime increases the intervention threshold in both
countries [see eq. (26)] and thus increases the welfare in each country [eq. (27)]. This
effect is mitigated by the interaction between the intervention threshold in both coun-
tries (δλ̃B/δλ̃A < 0). The increase of the intervention threshold in country A lowers the
probability of contagion in country B and thus leads to a decrease in the intervention
threshold of country B as the expected return of continuation is increased.18
Now interestingly, the indirect welfare effect of a more centralized supervisory regime
that is due to the interaction of λ̃ and k is negative. This follows from the unambigu-
ously negative effect of λ̃ on the capital standard that is set non-cooperatively [see
eq. (29)], which in turn decreases the welfare in country A [see eq. (28)]. The negative
18Formally, this can be seen by using the implicit function theorem on (10).
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sign in (29) is due to two effects. On the one hand, the marginal increase of λ̃ decreases
the positive effect of capital standards on the expected cost of bank failure [first term in
the numerator of (29)], while at the same time it increases the marginal social return of
bank investment in country A [second term in the numerator of (29)]. Both effects lead
to a decrease in the capital standards that are set non-cooperatively as summarized in
Proposition 1. This in turn reduces the welfare in country A for two reasons. First, it
reinforces the externality in the first stage of the model that is due to the competition
for mobile bank investment [first term in (28)]. Second, the probability that the bank
subsidiary in country A can draw on liquidation funds of the bank subsidiary that is
located in country B is reduced [second term in (28)].
In Appendix A.4 we derive the total welfare effect. This shows that a sufficient con-
dition for the overall welfare effect of a marginal increase in the centralization of the















− 2 + 4k2c
]
> 16k4c [h(lr) + h(lc)] . (30)
We can analyse condition (30) in the following way. If the externalities that are caused
by the capital reallocation of the multinational bank react very sensitive to a marginal
increase of capital standards, the right hand side of (30) will be very high. Thus, in
this case the overall welfare effect of an increase in the centralization of supervision will
very likely be positive. Intuitively, this is due to the fact that each national regulation
authority will then only slightly decrease its capital standard when a more centralized
intervention regime is introduced. Thus, the negative welfare effect that is illustrated
in (28) is limited. In contrast, the left hand side is a positive function of the profitability
of bank investment. Intuitively, in this case the positive externality of k is very high
[see eq. (18)]. Therefore, the decrease in the non-cooperative equilibrium of capital
standards that follows from a more centralized resolution regime imposes higher welfare
losses. While k enters both sides of (30), we can directly see that it is weighted by
different parameters. Whenever a is relatively low and thus bank investment is relatively
profitable, the left hand side of (30) will be reduced to a lower degree. Similarly,
whenever c is relatively low, the (positive) effect of k on the right hand side of (30)
will be small. Therefore, we can summarize our findings at this stage in:
Proposition 2 Whenever the capital standard is set non-cooperatively and the result-
ing externality due to the mobility of bank investment is sufficiently severe [ (30) holds],
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moving from a national intervention regime with too little intervention to a more glob-
ally oriented resolution regime will be welfare decreasing.
Our model thus shows that in the presence of further regulatory instruments, the
desirability of a more centralized intervention regime that was brought forward in the
recent literature is no longer unambiguous. The reasoning follows the theory of the
second best.19 This is due to the fact that in our model, there exist externalities at
multiple stages. First, when national regulation authorities choose the optimal amount
of capital standards they only consider the negative effect of an increase in ki on
mobile bank investment (δα/ki < 0) in their country. From a global perspective this is
a zero-sum game [see eq. (18)]. Second, when national supervision authorities choose
the level of intervention they fail to account for the international spillovers that are
caused by the reallocation of capital within the multinational bank network in case of
unilateral shocks. Now, importantly, when both regulatory instruments are determined
non-cooperatively, they partly balance each other. National authorities will impose
stricter capital standards when they expect higher costs from the subsidiary that is
resident in its country, which in turn partly compensates for the externality at the first
stage. Therefore, once full cooperation is not achieved in both regulatory tools, the
gains from a more centralized intervention regime might disappear in the presence of
lower capital standards that arise due to less protection and more intense competition
at the level of national regulation authorities.
4.2 Case 2: national supervision that is too strict
We now move to the case where the intervention threshold that is set by a national
supervisory regime is too high from a global welfare perspective. While in this case a
marginal increase in γ leads to a decrease in λ̃ [see eq. (26)] it obviously also increases
the welfare in both countries [see eq. (27)]. Different to case 1, this positive welfare effect
is reinforced through the interaction of the intervention thresholds in both countries.
This is due to the fact that the decrease in the intervention threshold in country A
increases the probability of rescue for the subsidiary that is located in country B.
For country B, this in turn increases the expected social return from continuation of
its locally resident subsidiary and thus equally decreases the intervention threshold in
country B.
19See Lipsey and Lancaster (1956) for the seminal paper in this literature.
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The indirect welfare effect of an increase in δ that is due to the interaction of λ̃ and
k has two parts. First, as in case 1, moving to a more globally oriented intervention
regime increases the value of each unit of bank investment. Ceteris paribus, this leads
to a decrease in the capital standard that is set non-cooperatively [see eq. (20)]. Second,
however, the decrease in λ̃ also leads to an increase in the expected probability of bank




















Intuitively, the increase in the probability of rescue does not compensate the increase
in the probability of bank failure. This in turn, ceteris paribus, increases the capital
standard of each country [see eq. (20)]. We can summarize this result in:
Proposition 3 Moving towards a more globally oriented intervention regime is more
likely to be welfare increasing when the externality at this stage is negative, e.g. national
supervisory regimes would intervene too often.
Therefore, comparing case 1 and 2, we can conclude that the conventional result of
a more centralized intervention regime being associated with positive welfare effects
is more likely to hold when national supervisory authorities would intervene too often
from a global welfare perspective. However, this is in contrast to the experience from the
recent crisis, where national regulation authorities were accused of intervening only at
the last stages (Claessens et al., 2010; Beck and Wagner, 2016). Intuitively, decreasing
the intervention threshold (as in case 2) ceteris paribus increases the capital standards
and thus reduces the positive externality at the first stage. In contrast, increasing the
intervention threshold (as in case 1) ceteris paribus decreases the capital standard and
therefore reinforces the positive externality at the first stage.
5 Conclusion
In this model, we analyse the interaction between capital standards and resolution pro-
cedures when bank investment is mobile. In our setting, national regulation authorities
non-cooperatively choose capital standards at the first stage. The multinational bank
then allocates capital between its subsidiaries in the second stage. The outcome of
both stages depends on the anticipation of the intervention regime at the third stage.
Here we differentiate between a national and global intervention regime. The results of
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the paper stress the importance of a coordinated approach towards the determination
of capital standards and the decision to intervene into the operation of multinational
bank subsidiaries. Interestingly, in this regard, Europe and the United States seem to
follow different directions.
So far, the United States have abstained from closer international integration in the
supervision and intervention of multinational banks. At the same time, however, the
leverage ratio for eight systemically important banks has been substantially raised
above the level that is foreseen under the Basel 3 framework. This reaction is in line
with the results of our paper. As the regulatory authorities in the United States can
expect the intervention into multinational banks to be potentially very difficult, they
have a strong incentive to impose strict capital standards as the main instrument to
limit the potential costs.
In contrast, the introduction of the (not yet fully completed) Single Resolution Mech-
anism shows the determination of many European countries to move towards a cen-
tralized intervention regime for multinational banks. Clearly, this would be welfare
optimal if all countries within the eurozone would also fully coordinate with respect
to the determination of capital standards. To this regard, all countries within the eu-
rozone have adapted the Basel 3 regulatory framework and are supervised under the
Single Supervisory Mechanism. But, due to the lack of common capital definitions and
further scope for national authorities, Danièle Nouy, chair of the supervisory board
of the ECB, recently pointed out that the process of harmonisation is still far from
completed.20 Applying the results of this paper, we should expect all countries within
the Euro Zone to insist on most favorable terms for all banks that are located within
their jurisdiction. However, comparing the approaches of the US and the eurozone, this
paper suggests that the consistent enforcement of harmonized capital requirements, in
all details, will be the critical determinant for the centralised intervention approach of
the eurozone to be successful.
20See www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/press/speeches/date/2015/html/se150331.en.html for in-
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Appendix
A.1 Derivation of Eq. (15)



























































































Then, multiplying all terms with k2Ak
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2a[(1− λ̃A)2k2B + (1− λ̃B)
2k2A]
. (A.3)
Finally, slightly rearranging terms we arrive at Eq. (15).
A.2 Derivation of sign of Eqs. (18) and (19)
Substituting Eqs. (1) and (4) into (12), we can derive the marginal return of investment
for the subsidiary in country A:







Now, for kA to be binding independent of the allocation of equity by the multinational
bank it must be true that MRA > 0 even for α = 1. Then, looking at Eq. (18),
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it becomes clear that in this case the numerator of (18) will be negative and thus
∂α
∂kA
< 0. Looking at Eq. (19), we can see that a sufficient condition for ∂α
∂λ̃A











+ (1− λ̃)k < 0 . (A.5)
Now, substituting γ1 into the intervention threshold that is chosen by the supervisory



















This shows that γ1 < 0 and thus
∂α
∂kA
< 0 whenever it holds that
(1− λ̃)
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where the left hand side of (A.7) is the sum of the failure cost (first term) and the
liquidation cost (second term) that is not internalized by the bank. The right hand side
measures the consumer surplus that is due to the investment of the subsidiary.
A.3 Derivation of Eqs. (25)-(29)





















































= 0 for γ = 0 and that,
due to the symmetry between both countries, it holds that δλ̃A/δγ = δλ̃B/δγ = δλ̃/δγ.
To arrive at Eq. (26), we first substitute Eq. (10) in Eq. (11) to derive the condition

































= 0 . (A.10)
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Then, using the implicit function theorem on (A.10) we arrive at Eq. (26). Eqs. (27)
and (28) follow directly from taking the first derivative of the expected welfare function
in Eq. (9) with respect to λ̃B and kB, respectively. To arrive at Eq. (29), we take Eq. (20)
and use the implicit function theorem.
A.4 Derivation of condition (30)
As we are only interested in a sufficient condition for ∂WFA
∂γ



























































< 0 , (A.13)









> 0 we can exclude this term
from Eq. (25) and state the following condition:
∂WFA
∂γ

























< 0 , (A.14)
where the second term in Eq. (A.14) measures the indirect welfare effect that is due





















































































Then, we apply the maximum values that are shown in Eqs. (A.16)-(A.18) for all terms
that enter negatively in condition (A.15) . Finally, multiplying all terms in (A.15) with
16k4(1 − λ̃2)2, taking the maximum value of (1 − λ̃2)2 ≤ 1 for all terms that enter
negatively in (A.15) and slightly rearranging terms, we arrive at condition (30).
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